In　a　supply　chain,　customers　have　heterogeneity　preferences　due　to　channel　stickiness　and　brand　stickiness.　The　complicated　behaviors　of　different　customers　(i.e.,　target　customers　and　experience　customers)　results　can　lead　to　channel　cannibalization,　which　increases　the　difficulties　of　manufacturers　choosing　between　traditional　channel　and　dual-channel　supply　chain.　Therefore,　to　examine　this　claim　more　carefully,　we　develop　Stackelberg　game　models　to　analyze　channel　selection　decisions　under　the　monopoly　competition　and　the　duopoly　competition.　The　equilibrium　pricing　and　quality　strategies　are　compared　in　the　dual-channel　supply　chain　with　that　in　the　traditional　channel　and　the　single　online　channel.　Results　show　that　the　channel　cannibalism　is　mainly　brought　on　by　the　behaviors　of　the　target　customers.　The　corresponding　negative　effects　will　be　reduced　through　the　flexible　pricing　and　quality　strategies,　which　depend　on　the　consumer　types,　channel　preferences,　and　brand　preferences.　Under　the　monopoly　competition,　the　single　online　channel　is　not　the　dominant　option　for　the　monopolistic　manufacturer　since　the　expected　profits　of　the　experiential　customers　cannot　be　obtained　to　the　utmost.　When　the　commissions　of　the　e-commerce　platform　commissions　are　low,　the　manufacturer　prefers　to　the　low-quality　strategy　to　prevent　the　experience　customers　hemorrhaging　from　the　physical　retail　channel.　With　the　commissions　increasing,　the　manufacturer　adopts　the　high-quality　strategy　to　attract　the　customers　to　the　e-commerce　platforms,　and　decrease　the　channel　cannibalization.　When　the　efficiency　of　the　direct　online　sale　is　high　or　the　commissions　of　the　e-commerce　platforms　are　lower　than　the　given　threshold,　the　manufacturer　prefers　to　the　dual-channel　supply　chain.　Moreover,　the　less　customers　the　brand　stickiness,　the　greater　the　value　of　profits　of　the　manufacturer　in　the　dual-channel　supply　chain.