Reward　has　been　proved　to　be　an　effective　mechanism　to　sustain　cooperation　among　selfish　individuals.　In　this　paper,　we　propose　a　history　loyalty-based　reward　in　which　a　cooperator　can　gain　additional　reward　if　the　time　he　sticks　to　the　cooperation　strategy　is　over　a　loyalty　threshold.　Accordingly,　defectors　have　to　bear　the　cost　of　reward　subsequently.　The　results　on　the　spatial　public　goods　game　show　that　the　cooperation　could　be　immensely　enhanced　when　the　loyalty　threshold　and　the　reward　factor　are　suitable.　Besides,　the　time　evolution　of　cooperator　density　and　the　spatial　distribution　of　cooperators　and　defectors　are　investigated.　Our　work　extends　the　form　of　reward　in　the　evolution　of　spatial　public　goods　game.　(C)　2019　Published　by　Elsevier　B.V.