We　study　the　impact　of　heterogeneous　aspirations　on　the　spatial　public　goods　game　(PGG)　in　a　square　lattice.　An　aspiration　parameter　u　is　introduced　to　decide　who　will　be　more　probably　to　become　the　potential　strategy　source　in　structured　population.　Individuals　are　divided　into　two　groups　A　(u　＞　0)　and　B(u　=　0)　by　fraction　v　and　1　-　v.　We　study　how　u　and　v　affect　cooperation　in　the　PGG.　For　low　values　of　u,　the　cooperation　level　monotonously　increases　as　v　increases.　However,　for　large　values　of　u,　there　exist　an　intermediate　v　approximate　to　0:　5　for　which　cooperation　thrives　best.　The　influence　of　noise　is　also　investigated.　We　find　that　the　highest　threshold　of　phase　transition　is　reached　at　the　middle　value　of　noise.