This　paper　investigates　a　three-echelon　closed-loop　supply　chain　(CLSC)　consisting　of　a　manufacturer,　a　distributor,　and　a　retailer,　where　the　retailer　exhibits　fairness　concerns.　Cooperative　and　non-cooperative　game　theoretic　analyses　are　employed　to　characterize　interactions　among　different　parties.　Analytical　results　confirm　the　conventional　wisdom:　with　the　retailer＇s　fairness　concerns,　the　channel　profits　under　the　decentralized　and　partial-coalition　models　underperform　that　under　the　centralized　model.　To　find　an　appropriate　profit　allocation　scheme　to　coordinate　the　supply　chain　system　with　fairness　concerns,　we　resort　to　the　cooperative　game　theory.　To　this　end,　we　first　derive　the　characteristic　function　form　of　the　cooperative　game　based　on　the　equilibrium　profits　under　centralized,　decentralized　and　different　partial-coalition　models.　Subsequently,　we　propose　three　coordination　mechanisms　based　on　the　Shapley　value,　nucleolus　solution,　and　equal　satisfaction　to　allocate　surplus　profit.　The　three　mechanisms　are　then　evaluated　by　using　numerical　experiments.　We　further　examine　how　the　retailer＇s　fairness　concerns　affect　profit　allocation　under　the　three　mechanisms.　The　key　innovation　is　to　incorporate　the　retailer＇s　fairness　concerns　into　the　coordination　of　a　three-echelon　CLSC.　Our　contributions　are　twofold:　First,　cooperative　game-theoretic　mechanisms　are　put　forward　to　coordinate　the　three-echelon　CLSC　with　a　fairness-minded　retailer.　Second,　we　investigate　how　the　retailer＇s　fairness　concerns　affect　the　CLSC　members＇　pricing　decision　and　surplus　profit　allocation.　Our　studies　confirm　that　the　resulting　profit　allocation　schemes　satisfy　both　individual　and　collective　rationality　and　fall　in　the　core　of　the　cooperative　game,　thereby　making　the　grand　coalition　stable　and　suggesting　viable　options　to　coordinate　the　CLSC　system.　Further　analyses　reveal　that　different　coordination　mechanisms　benefit　the　three　CLSC　members　differently.　These　research　findings　help　CLSC　managers　to　understand　what　options　are　available　and　identify　possible　pathways　for　them　to　foster　cooperation　and　achieve　equitable　allocation　of　surplus　profit.　©　2019　Elsevier　B.V.