Collaborative　knowledge　creation　is　important　for　firms　to　maintain　and　gain　new　competitive　advantages,　but　knowledge　outgoing　spillover　harms　their　competitive　advantages,　which　puts　them　into　a　dilemma　when　making　knowledge　creation　decision　in　innovation　network.　In　this　paper,　the　collaborative　knowledge　creation　in　innovation　network　is　modeled　as　a　Stackelberg　leader-follower　game　with　one　core　firm　and　multisubordinate　firms.　We　discuss　the　knowledge　input　decision　and　knowledge　output　allocation　of　network　members　by　introducing　the　knowledge　incoming　spillover　coefficient,　private　knowledge,　knowledge　outgoing　spillover　loss　and　other　variables.　Through　the　analysis,　we　find　that:　1)　The　core　firm　and　the　subordinate　firm＇s　knowledge　input　rate　and　the　total　amount　of　knowledge　input　are　related　with　gains　from　collaborative　knowledge　creation　fruits　and　knowledge　incoming　spillover　profit,　but　are　not　related　with　private　knowledge　outgoing　spillover　loss;　2)　The　condition　that　the　collaborative　knowledge　creation　mechanism　in　cluster　innovation　network　runs　is　that　the　core　firm＇s　knowledge　creation　profit　(i.e.　gains　from　knowledge　creation　fruits　and　knowledge　incoming　spillover　profit)　is　big　enough;　3)　The　core　firm＇s　knowledge　input　rate　is　positively　related　to　its　marginal　gain　and　the　knowledge　incoming　coefficient,　and　it　is　negatively　related　to　the　subordinate　firm＇s　marginal　gain　and　knowledge　incoming　coefficient;　4)　In　the　process　of　collaborative　knowledge　creation,　the　subordinate　firms　will　allocate　the　investment　rate　of　knowledge　according　to　the　marginal　gain　and　the　knowledge　incoming　coefficient.　©　2019,　Editorial　Office　of　Control　and　Decision.　All　right　reserved.