This　paper　investigates　the　impact　of　subnational　institutional　contingencies　on　executive　pay　dispersion　structure　and　the　relationship　between　pay　dispersion　and　firm　performance.　Using　executive　compensation　data　on　Chinese　listed　firms　between　2000　and　2011,　we　find　that　executive　pay　dispersion　is　significantly　lower　in　state-owned　enterprises　(SOEs),　while　is　significantly　higher　in　cross-listed　firms　and　to　a　smaller　degree　in　firms　located　in　developed　regions.　There　is　also　evidence　that　executive　pay　dispersion　is　smaller　during　the　voluntary　compensation　disclosure　period.　After　controlling　for　endogeneity　of　pay　determination,　we　find　that　executive　pay　dispersion　is　positively　associated　with　firm　performance.　In　addition,　the　positive　link　between　executive　pay　dispersion　and　firm　performance　is　stronger　in　non-SOEs　than　in　SOEs,　and　stronger　in　firms　located　in　more　developed　regions　than　those　not.　Our　findings　are　also　robust　to　alternative　measures　of　pay　dispersion　and　firm　performance.　©　2015,　Springer　Science+Business　Media　New　York.