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author:

Xiang, X. (Xiang, X..) [1] | Li, M. (Li, M..) [2]

Indexed by:

Scopus

Abstract:

The incentive problem in supply chain with asymmetric information is one of the important research contents. The existing supply chain research results are obtained under the condition that the amount of the principal's information is given, in fact, the amount of the principal's information is optional. Based on this understanding and the previous research results, this paper constructs a new monitoring and incentive model with asymmetric information for supply chain partnership. The paper deepens, extends the supply chain incentive research content and deepens people's understanding of supply chain management .It is helpful for applying the theory of supply chain management. ©2010 IEEE.

Keyword:

Incentive; Monitoring; Partnership; Supply chain

Community:

  • [ 1 ] [Xiang, X.]School of Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, Fujian, China
  • [ 2 ] [Li, M.]School of Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, Fujian, China

Reprint 's Address:

  • [Xiang, X.]School of Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, Fujian, China

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Source :

2010 International Conference on E-Product E-Service and E-Entertainment, ICEEE2010

Year: 2010

Language: English

Cited Count:

WoS CC Cited Count:

SCOPUS Cited Count:

ESI Highly Cited Papers on the List: 0 Unfold All

WanFang Cited Count:

Chinese Cited Count:

30 Days PV: 0

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