A　redactable　consortium　blockchain　(RCB)　can　build　a　trust　layer　for　industrial　internet　of　things　(IIoT)　so　as　to　enable　IIoT　to　resist　certain　powerful　attacks　resulting　in　improper　block　content.　The　redactability　is　particularly　important　for　blockchains　applied　in　IIoT　with　valuable　or　sensitive　activities　such　as　financial　IoT　or　energy-trading　IoT.　Huang　et　al.　proposed　a　threshold　chameleon　hash　(TCH)　scheme　and　then　constructed　an　accountable-and-sanitizable　chameleon　signature　scheme　based　on　TCH.　These　two　primitives　are　further　used　as　fundamental　modules　to　build　an　RCB,　which　empowers　IIoT　devices　to　operate　the　blockchain　in　a　controllable　way.　However,　our　paper　shows　that　Huang　et　al.＇s　RCB　suffers　from　a　security　problem　that　weakens　the　crucial　redactability.　Specifically,　we　find　out　that　if　a　transaction　in　a　given　block　is　legally　redacted　by　all　authorized　sensors　who　collectively　hold　the　private　redacting　key,　anyone　(without　any　private　information)　can　further　redact　this　redacted　transaction　and　delete　any　transaction　within　this　redacted　block　and,　meanwhile,　any　sensor　user　with　a　private　signing　(not　redacting)　key　can　insert　a　forged　transaction　into　this　redacted　block.　We　further　address　this　threat　by　replacing　the　TCH　module　in　Huang　et　al.＇s　RCB　with　our　designed　TCH.