Distributed　spatial　cloaking　(DSC)　enables　users　to　enjoy　precise　location-based　service　(LBS)　with　location　privacy　preserving.　An　incentive　mechanism　is　necessary　to　encourage　users　to　cooperate.　However,　due　to　the　inappropriate　design　of　incentive　mechanisms,　the　existing　works　cause　low　user　benefits　and　fail　to　encourage　users,　ruining　the　expected　incentive　effect.　Moreover,　introducing　a　third　party　to　manage　users＇　information　also　causes　the　existing　works　to　disclose　users＇　privacy　and　be　unpractical.　To　address　these　issues,　we　propose　a　utility-aware　incentive　mechanism-based　distributed　spatial　cloaking　(RESAT).　By　the　idea　of　utility　theory　and　optimization　theory,　RESAT　devises　basic　and　extended　incentive　mechanisms.　The　two　mechanisms　for　assuming　that　all　users　are　honest　and　that　malicious　users　provide　unreasonable　locations.　RESAT　proposes　an　incentive　mechanism-based　cloaking　cooperation　without　a　third　party,　incorporating　the　developed　mechanisms　based　on　the　blind　signature.　Theoretical　analysis　indicates　that　RESAT　achieves　incentive　compatibility　and　is　secure.　Extensive　experiments　on　the　real　data　set　show　that　compared　with　the　existing　works,　RESAT　enables　1　time　more　users　to　cooperate　at　best　while　eliminating　the　malicious　behaviors　that　provide　unreasonable　locations.　The　required　DSC　construction　time　delay　is　limited.　©　2014　IEEE.