To　cope　with　the　environmental　pollution　caused　by　carbon　emissions,　Western　countries,　such　as　Switzerland　and　Germany,　have　implemented　corporate　carbon　taxes　to　reduce　carbon　emissions　and　have　achieved　significant　results.　As　one　of　the　world＇s　most　carbon-intensive　countries,　China　must　take　serious　action　to　limit　future　emission　increases　through　the　implementation　of　carbon　tax　policies.　This　study　investigated　the　evolutionary　strategies　and　mechanisms　of　the　interaction　between　new　energy　vehicle　manufacturers　and　local　governments　under　static　and　dynamic　carbon　taxes.　Based　on　prospect　theory,　we　constructed　evolutionary　game　models　between　new　energy　vehicle　manufacturers　and　local　governments　under　static　and　dynamic　carbon　tax　mechanisms.　This　study　explored　the　impact　of　different　initial　values　on　the　evolutionary　results　of　the　game　and　the　different　evolutionary　paths　of　the　system　under　static　and　dynamic　carbon　tax　mechanisms.　The　ideal　carbon　tax　starting　rate　was　determined　to　be　0.15.　The　results　of　the　theoretical　model　analysis　were　simulated　to　provide　a　theoretical　reference　for　the　establishment　of　a　carbon　tax　system　conducive　to　low-carbon　development.　The　results　of　the　study　were:　(1)　there　were　differences　in　the　paths　and　outcomes　of　the　system＇s　evolution　to　a　stable　state　under　different　initial　values　and　combinations　of　strategies;　(2)　the　dynamic　carbon　tax　mechanism　was　more　favorable　for　the　development　of　the　new　energy　vehicle　industry,　and　the　system　had　no　stable　point　and　equilibrium　strategy　under　the　static　carbon　tax　mechanism;　and　(3)　the　use　of　a　lower　starting　rate　at　the　beginning　of　the　carbon　tax　collection　process　was　helpful　in　encouraging　new　energy　vehicle　firms　to　select　a　low-carbon　production　strategy.　©　2023　Elsevier　Ltd