In　this　paper,　we　prove　from　a　new　angle　that　Dempster’s　rule　is　inherently　probabilistic,　extends　Bayes’　rule　and　reduces　to　Bayes’　rule　when　precise　probabilities　are　available,　regardless　of　whether　prior　is　uniform.　We　use　examples　to　demonstrate　this　equivalence.　Additionally,　we　explain　that　the　Evidential　Reasoning　(ER)　rule　is　also　probabilistic　and　includes　Bayes’　and　Dempster’s　rules　as　special　cases.　Furthermore,　we　address　some　criticisms　of　the　behaviour　of　Dempster’s　rule　from　a　probabilistic　perspective　and　explain　the　rationality　of　the　behaviour.　We　also　identify　instances　where　such　critiques　were　misapplied.　Finally,　we　clarify　vital　differences　between　belief　degrees　in　belief　functions　and　basic　probabilities　and　highlight　the　critical　differences　between　Shafer’s　discounting　method　and　the　ER　rule.　These　differences　make　the　latter　probabilistic,　while　the　former　is　not.　Our　motivation　is　to　show　that　evidence　theory　has　a　probabilistic　foundation　and　is　possible　to　become　probabilistic　again.　©　2025　The　Author(s).　Published　by　Informa　UK　Limited,　trading　as　Taylor　&　Francis　Group.