Under　the　LR-type　fuzzy　demand,　the　cost　sharing　contract　with　variable　ratio　and　quality　control　in　the　two-stage　supply　chain　are　researched.　In　the　condition　of　disaggregation　mode　without　sharing　recall　cost,　the　supply　chain　members　make　their　effort　to　insufficient　investment,　however,　they　try　to　make　complementation　in　the　central　supply　chain,　and　the　degree　of　complementation　is　increasing　with　the　growing　of　unit　recall　cost　and　total　defect　rate.　Through　importing　cost　sharing　contract　with　the　variable　ratio,　it　is　found　that　this　contract　can　exert　the　manufacturers　and　suppliers　to　make　their　effort　to　choose　the　complementary　effect,　and　it　exists　Nash　equilibrium　in　making　effort　to　choose　the　game　between　the　two　sides.　When　the　defect　analysis　cost　is　zero,　supply　chain　members　are　of　incentive　compatibility　under　the　contract　Φ,　and　the　total　profit　of　supply　chain　equals　to　the　optimal　profit　in　the　central　mode.　The　variable　allocation　proportion　analytic　solution　and　the　defect　rate　threshold　value　are　ensured.　Verification　results　show　that　the　invalid　cost　index　and　the　invalid　quality　index　of　the　contract　Φ　are　both　lower　than　the　cost-sharing　contract　with　the　fixed　ratio,　and　the　contract　Φ　is　more　reasonable　and　more　effective.　©　2016,　Editorial　Office　of　Control　and　Decision.　All　right　reserved.