Against　the　problem　of　urban　public　transport　operation　irregularities,　the　research　was　carried　out　to　study　the　game　relationship　between　management　departments　and　public　transport　enterprises.　The　profit　matrix　of　the　game　relations　was　established　according　to　the　corresponding　strategy　sets　of　public　transport　enterprises　and　management　departments.　Both　expected　profit　and　overall　average　profit　under　the　different　strategies　are　obtained.　Nash　equilibrium　was　obtained　using　replicator　dynamics　function　to　describe　the　changing　rate　of　both　strategies.　The　paper　also　establishes　the　game　model　of　public　transport　supervision　problem　by　using　system　dynamics　theory,　and　simulation　analysis　to　the　model　was　carried　out.　The　analysis　results　show　that,　when　using　static　penalty　strategy,　there　is　no　evolutionary　stable　strategy　except　Nash　equilibrium　on　both　sides,　and　fluctuations　are　difficult　to　control;　while　using　dynamic　penalty　strategy,　there　exists　evolutionary　stable　strategy　on　both　sides,　the　evolution　time　and　amplitude　are　positively　correlated　with　maximum　punishment　revenue,　and　game　steady-state　is　independent　of　the　initial　state.　©　2016,　Editorial　Board　of　Journal　of　Harbin　Institute　of　Technology.　All　right　reserved.