In　this　work,　a　sophisticated　model　is　proposed　to　study　the　effects　of　heterogeneous　types　of　individuals　on　the　evolution　of　cooperation.　In　the　prisoner＇s　dilemma　game,　the　whole　population　which　adopts　different　strategies　against　different　neighbors,　is　divided　into　two　types:　the　imitator　and　the　responsor.　The　imitator　updates　his　strategy　depending　on　the　payoffs　while　the　responsor　changes　his　strategies　according　to　the　other＇s　attitude.　Interestingly,　it　is　found　that　there　exists　an　intermediate　value　of　the　fraction　of　imitators　which　can　guarantee　the　best　cooperative　level　on　the　square　lattice　and　random　network.　The　feedback　reciprocity　mechanism　of　the　responsor,　the　strategy　transmission　probability,　and　the　connection　density　are　also　studied.　Our　results　are　helpful　for　understanding　the　specific　roles　played　by　each　type　of　individual　and　the　coexistence　of　the　two　groups　in　the　real　society.　©　2013　Elsevier　B.V.　All　rights　reserved.