This　paper　studies　two　manufacturer　rebate　strategies　in　a　green　supply　chain.The　results　show　that:1)Irrespective　of　the　type　of　rebate　strategy　used,channel　members　benefit;2)Rebates　for　green　products　improve　the　green　level　of　green　products;3)The　more　significant　the　slippage　effects　are,the　more　beneficial　the　rebate　strategies　are,for　channel　members.On　this　basis,the　model　is　expanded　to　consider　asymmetric　potential　market　demands　and　asymmetric　product　substitution　rates,respectively.The　results　show　that　the　product　substitution　rate　does　not　affect　the　strategic　preference　of　channel　members,but　the　potential　market　demand　does.