To　explore　the　influence　of　reference　effects　on　the　decision　making　of　green　supply　chain　members,　by　introducing　the　stochastic　reference　price　of　consumers　into　a　dual-channel　green　supply　chain,　a　two-stage　Stackelberg　model　was　constructed　with　game　theory,　and　the　consistent　pricing　strategy　of　online　and　offline　was　discussed.　The　results　showed　that　the　variability　of　consumers＇　reference　price　was　beneficial　to　the　manufacturer　and　the　retailer　when　the　consumers＇　green　preference　coefficient　was　high,　otherwise　the　variability　of　consumers＇　reference　price　was　good　for　the　manufacturer　but　bad　for　the　retailer.　With　the　increasing　of　the　sensitivity　coefficient　of　consumers＇　reference　price,　the　manufacturer＇s　expected　profit　first　decreased　and　then　increased,　but　the　retailer＇s　expected　profit　monotonically　decreased.　The　combination　contract　of　revenue　sharing　and　cost　sharing　could　coordinate　the　dual-channel　green　supply　chain.　By　comparing　with　the　single-channel　green　supply　chain　equilibrium,　the　result　showed　that　the　conditions　for　manufacturer　encroachment　were　both　affected　by　sensitivity　coefficient　and　the　variability　of　consumers＇　reference　price.　On　this　basis,　the　model　was　extended　to　differentiated　pricing,　and　the　impacts　of　different　pricing　strategies　on　channel　members　were　discussed.　©　2023　CIMS.　All　rights　reserved.