The　market-oriented　allocation　of　data　elements　is　crucial　to　the　development　of　digital　economy　in　China,　and　the　management　of　property　rights　of　data　elements　is　currently　the　main　direction　to　solve　the　gap　between　supply　and　demand.　However,　at　present,　the　lack　of　a　unified　right　determination　standard　for　data　elements　still　exposes　the　data　element　market　to　problems　such　as　unreasonable　property　rights　allocation　mechanism　and　imperfect　property　rights　income　distribution　mechanism,　seriously　hindering　the　sustainable　development　of　the　data　element　market.　In　this　case,　it　is　urgent　to　further　promote　the　innovation　and　improvement　of　the　data　element　market-oriented　allocation　mechanism,　and　accelerate　the　evolution　of　data　market　entities　towards　cooperation,　so　as　to　achieve　more　accurate　distribution　of　data　property　rights.　By　reviewing　the　characteristics　and　content　of　data　derivative　rights　in　existing　literature,　and　considering　the　actual　operation　of　the　data　market,　data　rights　were　hereby　summarized　into　three　main　categories,　including　data　holding　right,　control　right,　and　usage　right.　Then,　a　dual　multi-task　delegation　agent　model　was　introduced.　Besides,　the　configuration　methods　of　the　three　data　rights　among　market　entities　were　explored,　and　the　welfare　effects　of　different　configuration　mechanisms　were　deeply　analyzed　to　reveal　the　more　efficient　configuration　mechanism.　First,　the　situation　that　enterprises　monopolize　the　right　to　hold,　control　and　use　data　elements　was　discussed.　When　the　data　property　right　is　monopolized,　the　data　market　cannot　be　in　the　optimal　operation　state,　and　there　is　a　net　loss　of　social　welfare,　which　—　103　—　causes　needlessly　huge　loss　of　consumer　surplus　and　operator　surplus.　In　order　to　achieve　Kaldor-Hicks　efficiency,　market　competition　should　be　introduced,　and　the　prices　and　transaction　volumes　under　the　competitive　equilibrium　maximize　social　welfare.　Then,　the　situation　that　the　enterprises　retain　the　right　to　hold　and　control,　and　the　Data　Exchanges　exercise　the　right　of　use　was　discussed,　when　the　enterprises　control　the　income　structure　of　the　data　element　market,　so　that　the　absolute　dominance　interferes　with　the　production　activities　of　other　market　entities,　resulting　in　the　poor　circulation　of　data　elements.　In　addition,　in　order　to　reduce　uncertainty　factors　and　risk　costs,　the　Data　Exchanges　pursue　one-sided　profit　maximization　and　take　advantage　of　information　advantages　to　take　opportunistic　actions,　thus　resulting　in　excessive　waste　of　data　elements.　This　phenomenon　does　not　conform　to　the　logic　of　property　rights　allocation,　making　it　necessary　to　seek　a　three-right　separation　data　element　market　allocation　mechanism.　Finally,　the　situation　where　the　governments　hold　the　holding　right,　the　enterprises　retain　the　control　right　and　the　Data　Exchanges　exercise　the　usage　right　was　introduced.　It　is　found　that　an　efficient　market-oriented　allocation　mechanism　of　data　elements　with　the　separation　of　three　rights　has　the　following　characteristics:　1)　The　enterprises　only　retain　the　residual　control　right,　and　reasonably　allocate　the　incentive　intensity　of　the　two　tasks,　so　that　the　increase　and　decrease　mutually　restrict　each　other,　and　the　Data　Exchanges　are　encouraged　to　allocate　the　effort　level　of　the　two　tasks　as　needed,　forming　a　flexible　income　distribution　mechanism;　2)　The　governments　hold　the　residual　claim　and　provide　enterprises　with　a　higher　proportion　of　social　benefit　sharing　to　compensate　for　costs　and　risks　in　view　of　all　the　cases　of　higher　payments　for　the　completion　of　the　two　tasks,　and　trigger　their　willingness　to　cooperate　with　the　Data　Exchanges　with　high　social　benefit　output;　3)　When　the　level　of　data　desensitization　efforts　is　not　highly　correlated　with　government　incentives,　or　the　government　supervision　is　increased,　the　government　can　increase　the　share　of　social　benefits　by　adjusting　the　tax　ratio　or　providing　partial　transfer　payments,　and　then　the　enterprises　will　be　more　willing　to　protect　citizen　privacy.　In　conclusion,　it　was　hereby　proposed　for　the　first　time　to　build　a　market-oriented　allocation　mechanism　that　separates　data　holding,　control　and　usage　rights.　Research　has　justified　the　contribution　of　this　mechanism　to　forming　a　reasonable　data　element　property　rights　governance　structure　linked　to　reward　payments　and　effort　performance,　which　can　effectively　control　the　monopoly　behavior　of　the　data　market,　meet　the　needs　of　data　market　development　and　multilateral　interests　maximization,　and　provide　innovative　ideas　for　the　reform　of　data　element　market-oriented　allocation　in　China.　©　(2025),　(Zhejiang　University).　All　rights　reserved.