In　programmable　networks,　some　networking　systems　coordinate　data　plane　switches　to　perform　in-network　functions　(e.g.,　in-band　network　telemetry).　However,　the　vulnerabilities　associated　with　inter-device　coordination　remain　largely　unexplored　and　overlooked,　which　is　highly　concerning　given　the　increasing　popularity　of　this　paradigm.　In　this　paper,　we　identify　three　attack　scenarios　built　upon　such　vulnerabilities,　where　attackers　mislead　the　behaviors　of　networking　systems.　We　implement　20　networking　systems　on　Tofino-based　switches　and　a　simulator　and　test　them　against　the　identified　attacks.　Our　experimental　results　show　that　our　attacks　severely　disrupt　the　normal　operation　of　these　networking　systems,　e.g.,　the　cache　hit　rate　of　NetCache　drops　by　38%.　However,　our　analysis　reveals　that　none　of　existing　methods　fully　mitigate　our　attacks　because　they　fail　to　verify　the　packets　for　inter-device　coordination.　To　this　end,　we　select　characteristics　from　existing　methods　while　addressing　their　limitations　to　design　effective　mitigation　methods.　Experimental　results　indicate　that　our　methods　perform　well　in　mitigating　our　attacks　and　introduce　acceptable　overheads.