In　this　article,　we　study　the　influences　of　manufacturer　rebate　on　the　outcomes　of　the　channel　members　in　a　green　supply　chain,　where　the　retailer　has　private　information　about　market　demand.　We　find　that,　(1)　manufacturer　rebate　is　good　for　the　channel　members,　however,　the　manufacturer　takes　a　lower　share　of　the　incremental　profit　than　the　retailer;　(2)　the　value　of　manufacturer　rebate　for　the　channel　members　increases　as　the　promotion　frequency　and　the　slippage　effect　increase.　Then,　we　extend　the　models　to　the　cases　with　information　sharing　and　simultaneous　game　mode,　respectively.　The　results　show　that,　(1)　information　sharing　benefits　the　manufacturer,　but　does　not　necessarily　hurt　the　retailer;　(2)　a　suitable　manufacturer　rebate　strategy　will　promote　the　retailer　to　share　the　demand　information;　(3)　the　first-mover　advantage　of　manufacturer　benefits　himself,　but　hurts　the　retailer　and　the　channel.