There　is　a　principle-agent　relationship　between　central　government　and　all　levels　local　governments　on　land　protection.　The　local　government　is　the　administrator,　demander　and　the　only　supplier　for　the　local　land　market.　The　problems　in　the　land　protection　such　as　externalities,　asymmetric　information,　over-long　agent　chain　and　the　shortage　of　effective　incentive　systems　lead　to　the　behavior　deviation　of　the　local　government,　and　also　promote　the　gaming　between　the　local　government　and　the　central　government　for　the　maximum　profits　of　the　local　citizen,　officials　and　local　governments,　therefore,　result　in　the　nonstandard　land　market　of　China　and　unreasonable　land　use.　Principally,　such　deviation　could　be　attributed　to　the　institutional　environment　of　the　local　government＇s　behaviors　and　the　officers＇　attitude　toward　politics.　With　the　application　of　the　government　behavior　theory,　game　theory　and　statistical　method,　this　paper　analyzes　the　behavior　logics　and　institutional　factors　that　result　in　the　deficiency　of　the　land　protection　of　the　local　government,　basing　on　the　characteristics,　the　motivation　and　land　management　systems　of　Chinese　local　governments.　Furthermore,　approaches　and　measures　for　adjustment　such　as　property　order　of　the　land,　management　system,　and　profits　share　system　and　the　index　for　political　achievement　assessment　is　provided　for　policy-makers.